Since Friedman (1953) , an advantage often attributed to flexible exchange rate regimes over fixed regimes is their ability to insulate more effectively the economy against real shocks. I use a post-Bretton Woods sample (1973-96) of seventy-five developing countries to assess whether the responses of real GDP, real exchange rates, and prices to terms-of-trade shocks differ systematically across exchange rate regimes. I find that responses are significantly different across regimes in a way that supports Friedman's hypothesis. The paper also examines the importance of terms-of-trade shocks in explaining the overall variance of output and prices in developing countries.
Introduction
In the early 1950s, Milton Friedman made his case in favor of flexible exchange rate regimes, based on the fact that, in a world with sticky prices, the nominal exchange rate could be used to insulate the economy against real shocks. Since then, a number of theories have confirmed his original intuition and it has become one of the least disputed arguments in favor of flexible exchange rate regimes. 1 An empirical implication of this set of theories is that the short run response to real shocks should differ across exchange rate regimes. In particular, regimes that allow for a larger movement in relative prices should have smoother adjustment of output to real shocks. The aim of this paper is to test and quantify Friedman's hypothesis.
The reason why the exchange rate regime may matter is the presence of some kind of price stickiness. Friedman argued that when economies are hit by real shocks the countries that can change relative prices more quickly have smoother adjustment in terms of quantities. In particular, he noticed that in a world with sticky prices the speed at which relative prices adjust depends crucially on the exchange rate regime. Under a flexible regime, relative prices can adjust immediately through changes in the nominal exchange rate, while under fixed regimes the changes happen at the rate permitted by the nominal stickiness, which is usually much slower. Therefore, flexible regimes should have smoother quantity responses and quicker relative price adjustments to real shocks than do fixed regimes. 2 Once the nominal price stickiness is relaxed, differences across regimes should vanish.
Given the prominent role played by exchange rate regimes in developing countries, it is perhaps surprising that there is scant empirical work addressing the validity of Friedman's hypothesis. Most of the empirical literature on exchange rate regimes presents no direct test of the hypothesis addressed in this paper because it makes no distinction between nominal and real shocks. For instance, Baxter and Stockman (1989) , Flood and Rose (1995) , and Ghosh et al. (1997) examine output and real exchange rate volatility across exchange 1 Subsequent to Friedman (1953) , a large number of authors examined the choice of regime under the assumption of price or wage stickiness (see Turnovsky (1983) , and Flood and Marion (1989) ; see Dornbusch (1980) for direct descendants of the open economy Mundell Fleming models with sticky prices; see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) for dynamic general equilibrium models with nominal stickiness.) 2 For instance, after a negative real shock, a currency depreciation reduces real wages precisely when labor demand is weak, and thus partially offsets the negative effect of the shock on output. rate regimes but do not distinguish between the contribution of real and nominal shocks in the volatility of those variables. 3 Aside from the greater variability of real exchange rates in countries with flexible regimes, they find little evidence of systematic differences in the behavior of other macroeconomic variables across regimes. By contrast, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) find that output and inflation in G-7 countries have responded differently to aggregate demand shocks under the Bretton Woods system and the regime of flexible rates that has prevailed subsequently. The focus of their paper, however, is different from the mechanism underlying Friedman's theory.
In this paper, in order to focus on Friedman's hypothesis, the analysis is restricted to a single real shock given by the terms of trade of a country (the ratio between export prices and import prices in the same currency). Evidence is presented suggesting that the terms-of-trade series can be treated as exogenous for the sample of developing countries examined. The exogeneity of the terms of trade helps identifying the response of real GDP, real exchange rate, and consumer prices to terms-of-trade changes across different regimes, eliminating the need for complex identification strategies and interpretations of estimated residuals. The sample used includes data for seventy-five developing countries from 1973 to 1996.
The findings of this paper provide ample empirical support for Friedman's hypothesis.
The following results are obtained: (a) the short-run real GDP response to terms-of-trade changes is significantly smaller in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes (floats) than in those with fixed regimes (pegs). Differences are mostly driven by the response to negative shocks. After two years, a 10% fall in the terms of trade reduced real GDP by 1.9% in pegs and 0.2% in floats; (b) after a negative shock, the real exchange rate is slow to depreciate in pegs, while it depreciates immediately and significantly in floats. Two years after a 10% negative shock, the real exchange rate has only depreciated by 1.3% in pegs and by 5.1% in floats. The response of the real exchange rate to positive shocks is not significantly different across regimes. In particular, there is no sharp appreciation in floats after positive shocks;
(c) in pegs, the delayed and small real depreciation comes from a fall in domestic prices.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that countries with flexible regimes are able to buffer real shocks better than those with fix regimes.
The empirical methodology is also used to estimate the importance of terms-of-trade shocks in explaining the overall variance of real GDP, the real exchange rate and the price level in developing countries. The paper finds that 30% of the real GDP fluctuations in developing countries with a fixed regime can be explained by terms-of-trade disturbances.
In floats, by contrast, the contribution of terms of trade to the variance of real GDP is approximately 10%. These contributions are substantially smaller from those found by Kose (2001) and Mendoza (1995) which are based in calibrations of real business-cycle models. In the case of the real exchange rate volatility, terms-of-trade shocks explain 13% in pegs and 31% in floats. That is, despite the well-documented larger real exchange rate volatility that exists in floats relative to pegs, terms-of-trade disturbances can explain a larger share of this volatility in floats than in pegs. The importance of terms-of-trade shocks in explaining the variance of real GDP, real exchange rates and prices varies considerably across time periods but less so across regions.
The sensitivity analysis performed in the paper highlights several important findings.
The pattern of dynamic responses to terms-of-trade shocks described above is present in all decades and regions, though it is most significant in the 80s and in Africa. The qualitative findings are not altered by using a purely de-facto exchange rate regime classification. The response to large and small terms-of-trade shocks follows the same pattern, though the responses to large shocks are statistically more significant. Highly dollarized countries with flexible regimes have similar short-run responses to those of the average float. Finally, the difference in level of financial development that exists across regimes is not the driving force of the results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the classification of exchange rate regimes and the data used, and examines the exogeneity assumption of terms of trade.
Section 3 introduces the empirical specification used and the dynamic response functions generated. Section 4 reports a series of robustness checks that include whether the response to a shock varies with the magnitude of the shock, with different samples, or over the various periods. Section 5 presents conclusions.
2 Testing Friedman's Hypothesis
The aim of this paper is to test Friedman's predictions with respect to how prices and quantities respond to real shocks under alternative exchange rate regimes. For this purpose, I use real GDP as a proxy for a measure of quantities for each country, the real exchange rate as a measure of relative prices between countries, and the consumer price index as a measure of internal prices. 4 The country-specific real shock used is the terms of trade.
Data Description

Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes
A primary input to test the above hypothesis is an exchange rate regime classification.
The basic reference for classification of exchange rate regimes is the International Monetary
Fund's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
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This classification is a de jure classification that is based on the publicly stated commitment of the authorities in the country in question. The report captures the notion of a formal commitment to a regime, but fails to capture whether the actual policies were consistent with the stated commitment. For example, de jure pegs can pursue policies inconsistent with their stated regime and require frequent changes in the nominal exchange rate, making the degree of commitment embedded in the peg in fact similar to a float. 6 Similarly, fear of floating can cause central banks to subordinate their monetary policy to eliminating fluctuations in the exchange rate, rendering a de jure float equivalent to a de facto peg. 7 The problems of the de jure classification can potentially be solved if the classification is 4 Consumer prices are examined for several reasons. First, the consumer price response of pegs helps uncover whether the real exchange rate adjustment in pegs is due to potentially important empirical problems (for instance, in the classification of regimes) or the result of the true underlying mechanism behind Friedman, that is, the change in "internal prices." Second, critics of the flexible system argue that in floats the change in internal prices may prevent the relative price adjustment from happening (see Friedman (1953) ). 5 The AREAER classification consists of nine categories, broadly grouped into pegs, arrangements with limited flexibility, and "more flexible arrangements", which include managed and pure floats. This description is based on the AREAER (1996). 6 Take Central America in the mid-80s as an example. El Salvador (1983) (1984) , Guatemala (1986 Guatemala ( -1988 and Nicaragua (1985 Nicaragua ( -1987 are classified as pegs (with respect to the dollar) in AREAER, while they had average nominal depreciations (with respect to the dollar) of 10%, 41% and 106% respectively. 7 For different causes of this "fear" see Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Reinhart (2000) . They have also examined numerous examples of this behavior, which include Bolivia (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , Peru (1990 Peru ( -1999 , and India (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Descriptive Statistics
The sample used consists of annual observations for developing, non-oil countries with populations larger than 1 million over the period 1973-1996. 9 Data sources, variable definitions and a list of the 75 countries with available data appear in the appendix (Table A1 and Ta-ble A2). A table summarizing the main variables by exchange rate regime is also presented in the appendix (Table A2) . 10 In the main text, I focus on the behavior of the terms of trade during the sample period, its relation to exchange rate regimes, and the time series
properties of the variables involved in the regression analysis that follows. 12 As a result, the empirical properties of the variables examined imply that estimating the VAR in first differences without imposing any cointegration relationships is a good approximation. Standard time-series tests further suggest that four lags should be used in the VAR.
Exogeneity of Terms of Trade
The assumption of exogeneity of the terms of trade for the countries under study is key for the identifying strategy used in the next section. In theory, the small country assumption is used as a rationale for these countries being price takers in world markets. In practice, however, despite the seventy-five developing countries in the sample accounting for less than 17 percent of world trade (in 1996), these countries can potentially influence the price of the goods they buy or sell. This sub-section shows that only a small number of countries exert such an influence and only on a small share of the goods they export. This finding, in turn, suggests that the bias introduced by assuming exogenous terms of trade is small. Table 2A shows a list of all the goods for which the export share of any developing country exceeds 15 percent of the world export of that good. Only 22 goods from 9 countries (out of a sample of 1000 goods and 75 countries) satisfy this criteria. 13 Furthermore, these exported goods account for a small share of the countries' total exports (on average, 6.2%). This suggests that, inasmuch as monopoly power depends on the market share of the exported goods, the price taking assumption is a good approximation for most of the countries involved.
Some specific exceptions remain, notably, Brazil's iron ore exports and Cote d'Ivoire's cocoa exports. For these cases, it then becomes important to assess the effect of the en- 12 A statistical appendix is available from the author upon request. It includes: a) Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1995)'s panel test for cointegration. Kao's method was applied for pairwise comparison of these variables, while Pedroni's statistic tests the existence of two or three cointegration vectors in the system; b) unit root tests for each countries; c) Portmanteau (Q) test for white noise for each country; d) Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997)'s panel unit-root tests. 13 Note that Chile's copper exports and Colombia's coffee exports are not included in the table since they account for 12.88 and 14.24 percent of world exports in 1996, respectively. dogeneity bias in the regression analysis. First, since the paper focuses on the different responses across exchange rate regimes, the bias has to be different across regimes for it to influence the results. The countries in Table 2A cover a broad range of regimes, from fully flexible regimes (Sri Lanka) to fixed regimes (Cote d'Ivoire). Second, if the endogeneity comes from the effects of real GDP on terms of trade, finding positive terms of trade coefficients may become more difficult. Take the case of Brazil's iron exports. A negative supply shock to the production of iron would increase Brazil's terms of trade at the same time that real GDP is falling, inducing a negative correlation between terms of trade and real GDP. As will be shown in section 4, the data suggests the opposite and, therefore, if anything, the bias makes finding positive and significant coefficients more difficult. Third, if the real exchange rate affects the terms of trade, the direction of the bias would be unclear and would depend on whether a country has monopoly power over the goods they buy or sell.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The above exceptions notwithstanding, Table 2B shows that exports, imports, and the real exchange rate fail to Granger cause the terms of trade in the developing countries included in the sample. The table also shows that, as expected, the exogeneity assumption of terms of trade is rejected for developed and oil-exporting countries. Reassuringly, all of the results prove to be robust to the exclusion of the countries listed in Table 2A . Several other papers (see Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2001) ) have used this exogeneity assumption in calibrations of real-business-cycle models.
Empirical Model and Results
Panel VAR
This sub-section models the empirical behavior of real GDP (y it ) , real exchange rate (rer), consumer price level (p), and terms of trade (tt) in countries with different exchange rate regimes. The structural model estimated can be expressed as a panel VAR, 14 Three additional assumptions (a 23 = a 24 = a 34 = 0) are required for A 0 to be block diagonal and, in turn, to recover the structural coefficients. Changing the ordering of the remaining variables has no implication on the dynamic response functions. The reduced form of (1) is estimated using SUR. 15 To examine whether the responses to real shocks are different across exchange rate regimes, A(L) and B (L) are allowed to differ across regimes. For that purpose, Y it and X it are interacted with a dummy for the regime (R it , where R = P eg or F loat and Intermediate).
Furthermore, to avoid the influence of those years where countries change regime, I constrain the observations to satisfy the following condition:
That is, if a peg (float) today decides to float (peg), that observation is not included in the regression in the current period nor in the two periods that follow. Thus, I compare 14 The identification of the structural parameters only requires that a 0 12 , a 0 13 and a 0 14 be equal to zero. However, the exogeneity of tt implies this more strict assumption. As correctly pointed out by a referee, the overidentifying assumptions (i.e., a q 12 = a q 13 = a q 14 = 0 for q > 0) can be used as an additional test for the exogeneity of tt. A Hausman test for the difference in coefficients (with and without these assumptions) results in a chi(2) = 0.00. 15 Since each equation has lagged dependent variables, the consistency of the SUR estimates relies heavily on the errors being serially uncorrelated. Three potential sources of autocorrelation were tested: 1) the presence of fixed effects in the model in first differences using a procedure similar to that in Holtz-Eakin (1988); 2) the potential moving average structure of the errors in (1); and 3) omission of lags (using the tests provided in Arellano and Bond (1999) ). These tests are available upon request.
countries with fixed regimes that did not abandon the peg versus floats that did not abandon the float. Results without this restriction are presented in the next section.
The exchange rate regime of a country can be correlated with other characteristics of the country that may influence the response to shocks. To prevent these correlations from being captured by the exchange rate regime variable, a number of control variables are included in X it . In the general specification I try to control for the degree of openness, financial development, access to international capital markets, and fiscal policy. Openness is key to assessing the income effect of a given terms-of-trade change and hence its effect on GDP.
It is proxied by the share of trade in GDP (open it ). Financial development is proxied by the difference between quasi money and money as a share of GDP (findev it ). Finally, the change in the current account position (4ca_y it ) is proxied for access to foreign markets, and the change in real government expenditure as a share of GDP (4 ln g) serves as a control for fiscal policy. The only systematically significant controls are open it and 4 ln g. In both cases, including these controls makes the difference across regimes less significant. 16 The 90 percent confidence intervals were computed using the following Monte Carlo procedure. Let π 4k×1 = vec(Π) denote the reduced form estimated coefficients from the system in (1) where k = 4p + 1, and let ψ s = ψ s (π) = δY t+s δe tt t be a (4 × 1) vector where ψ js identifies the consequence of the innovation e tt t on variable j at date t + s. A 4k × 1 vector was then randomly generated from the (estimated) distribution of π, N(π, Ω ⊗ E(X 0 X) −1 ) ,where X includes all regressands. Denote this vector by b π (1) . Using b π (1) the VAR was re-simulated and b ψ As Figure 3 shows, the effect of the terms-of-trade change on real GDP in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes is significantly negative for the period contemporaneous to the shock and the three periods after the shock. The short run drop in real GDP following a 10% present value decrease in the terms of trade of 10% is around 1.9%. Figure 4 shows that the real exchange rate is almost unchanged during the first period after the shock and then it slowly depreciates. The long run real depreciation is 2.1%. Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that this real depreciation is achieved through a fall in the price level of the pegs and not from temporary departures from the fixed rate. These figures confirm that real shocks have large short-run effects on peg regimes which are consistent with the predicted sluggish adjustment in the real exchange rate since pegs rely on the sticky price level to produce such adjustment.
Main Results
Dynamic responses
Figures 6 and 7 show that in countries with flexible regimes the effect on real GDP is negligible, and that the response of the real exchange rate is immediate and significant.
In the period contemporaneous to the shock, the real exchange rate in floats depreciates by 4.1%. The joint response of real GDP and the real exchange rate is consistent with
Friedman's conclusion that floats can smooth the effects of negative real shocks and achieve a rapid depreciation of the real exchange rate since they can use the nominal exchange rate as an immediate adjustment variable. With respect to consumer prices, the response in floats is opposite in sign to that in pegs. The consumer price level in floats increases by approximately 2% within two years of the shock. 17 The comparison between responses of the alternative regimes suggest that significant differences in output and real exchange rates are only short-lived. Differences in the responses across regimes for these variables are only significant for the period contemporaneous to the shock and the first year after the shock. 18 After the second year, the magnitude of real GDP simulations. For each fixed lag, the 500th lowest and 9500th highest value of the corresponding impulse response coefficient were calculated. 17 Interestingly, the response of prices in opposite directions across regimes is consistent with evidence from Australia's experience under different exchange rate regimes. See Gruen and Shuetrim (1994) . 18 As will be shown below, a joint test for the equality in the five estimated coefficients of the terms of trade variable across regimes is rejected at the 5% level in each of the endogenous variables' equations (see the "Wald" column in Table 4 ). The estimated coefficients for the terms-of-trade variable on each of the equations in system (1) appear in Broda (2002) .
(real exchange rate) responses are always larger (smaller) in pegs than in floats but not significantly. Consistent with the spirit of Friedman's predictions, long-run differences across regimes are not significant. Moreover, domestic price responses do not differ significantly and therefore broadly concur with Friedman's predictions.
How important are terms-of-trade shocks?
The main objective of this sub-section is to determine the contribution of terms-of-trade shocks to the actual variance of real GDP, real exchange rates, and prices in developing countries. The contribution of terms of trade is computed by using standard variance decomposition techniques on the VAR described in the previous section. The estimated model suggests that terms-of-trade shocks explain approximately 13% of the real exchange rate volatility in pegs and 31% of real exchange rate fluctuations in 19 An alternative approach is to group each of the 75 countries under Fixed or Flexible depending on their average exchange rate regime during the period (as in Figure 2) , then estimate the VAR separately for each group of countries. These results are available in Broda (2002) . The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. 13 floats. In other words, while there is a larger real exchange rate volatility in floats relative to pegs, 20 terms-of-trade disturbances can explain a larger share of this volatility in floats than in pegs. Even in the case of floats the results are smaller than the 49% found by Mendoza (1995). As will be discussed below, the pattern of large contributions of terms of trade to real GDP in pegs and large contributions to real exchange rate in floats can be found in all the regions examined but is less apparent across time periods. For consumer prices, in turn, terms-of-trade shocks can explain approximately 20% of variation in pegs and around 11% in floats.
Asymmetry
In the main specification of the empirical model, the coefficients of the terms-of-trade variables are restricted to be the same no matter what sign the terms-of-trade shock takes. In other words, the responses to negative and positive shocks are assumed to be symmetric. I will now discuss the results in the case where shocks of different signs are allowed to have different coefficients and hence the response to positive and negative shocks can differ. This sub-section highlights the differences in responses to shocks of different signs within exchange rate regimes. The additional restrictions imposed on the model result in coefficients that are less robust to specification changes relative to the main empirical model.
The response to positive and negative shocks may be asymmetric within regimes. Under pegs, for example, the stickiness of prices might be larger when prices are required to fall compared with when they have to rise. This would imply that the adjustment to positive shocks should be smoother in terms of output since the change in relative prices are easier to bring about. Figure 9 and 10 depict the responses of real GDP and the real exchange rate to a negative (solid line) and positive (dotted line) 10% terms-of-trade change in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. In pegs, the short-run real GDP response is symmetric across shocks and the real exchange rate response is not significantly different from zero following a positive or negative shock. A Wald test for the null hypothesis that coefficients of the terms-of-trade variable in the real GDP (rer) regression are larger (smaller) after negative shocks than after positive shocks is rejected at the 1% level (not reported). These 20 See Table A2 in the appendix.
responses suggest that nominal rigidities may not be larger for downward relative to upward movements of the terms of trade.
[INSERT FIGURES 9-10 HERE]
In countries with flexible regimes, the response to shocks of opposite sign is less symmetric. Figure 12 shows that the real exchange rate sharply depreciates immediately following a negative shock but barely appreciates after a positive shock. This difference is only significant for the period contemporaneous to the shock. Two years after a positive shock, the real exchange rate has appreciated by 3.9%, which is not significantly different from the 5.7% real depreciation two years after a negative shock. The real GDP responses suggest that, after a positive shock, the impact effect on real GDP is larger than after a negative shock (see Figure 11 ). The different short-run responses of real GDP and real exchange rate suggests that countries follow a counter-cyclical exchange rate policy when shocks are negative but less so when shocks are positive. The long run responses are not significantly different. For an examination of the significance of these responses see Table 4 .
[INSERT FIGURES [11] [12] 4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Exchange Rate Regime Classification
Since the classification of exchange rate regimes is subject to numerous problems, I replicate the analysis of the previous section using different criteria for identifying regimes. I first examine the behavior of selected groups of countries with clearer regime classifications.
The groups were selected using information on Central Banks' interventions, specific events Table 4 . The VAR was computed under the same restrictions as in the main specification.
Using the de facto classification, the magnitude of the differences is smaller but statistically more significant than that using Ghosh et al.'s classification (even though the number of observations fall from 1286 to 729). The same is true when the VAR is estimated without 21 The CFA franc zone comprises 10 member countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 22 Even in these selected countries, those classified as floats are far from a text-book float. Take Ghana for example. During the 90s it is classified as a float by the IMF, Ghosh et al., and according to information about the behavior of its Central Bank. However, Ghana's Cedi was placed on a "controlled floating basis" in some years during the 80s and in a multiple exchange rate system during other years.
restriction (2) . 23 The last attempt to check the robustness of the exchange rate classification appears under Method (A) in Section 1. Under this method, separate VARs are estimated for two groups of countries: countries with limited exchange rate flexibility in the period as a whole, and countries with more flexibility. The exchange rate flexibility index used in Figure 2 is used to divide the groups. In particular, a cut-off point of 0.35 is used. Real GDP responses are larger for both regimes relative to the main specification, and real exchange rate responses are smaller, but a similar overall pattern emerges. Since separate VARs were estimated, the significance of the difference across regimes cannot be tested.
[INSERT 
Different Time Periods, Regions, and Shocks
Since the three decades included in the full sample differ considerably in many respects, it is natural to examine the stability of the transmission mechanism across time. Table 4 (section (2)) presents the impact, short-run and long-run responses of real GDP, real exchange rates and prices to a 10% decrease in terms of trade for three different time periods (1973-1981, 1982-1989 and 1990-1996) . Table 3 (middle section) shows the importance of terms-of-trade shocks in explaining the variance of the variables examined by time period.
The response to shocks in each period show the same general pattern as that in the full sample. In all the periods, large short-run real GDP changes in fixed regimes and large immediate depreciation in flexible regimes are observed. The sole exception is the behavior of price variables in the 90s. In countries with flexible regimes, consumer prices fall after a negative shock, while they rise in countries with fixed regimes. Despite the rise in consumer prices in pegs, the real exchange rate depreciates in the short run. This is mostly driven by the one-time devaluation of all CFA zone countries in 1994, which makes the separation between responses of different regimes more difficult. In general, results are most significant during the 80s and least significant during the 90s.
Despite the similar response to shocks in different decades, the importance of these shocks in explaining volatility across time periods varies substantially. The clearest example comes 23 In this case, the number of observations increases to 1578. from the behavior of countries with fixed regimes across time. Almost half of the long-run variance of real GDP in pegs during the 90s can be explained by terms-of-trade disturbances.
This share is roughly 15% in the 70s. Given that the transmission mechanism is stable across decades, this difference can mostly be explained by the fact that the overall variance of real GDP in pegs has fallen much more than the variance of terms-of-trade shocks between the 70s and the 90s (see Table 4 and Table A2 ). By contrast, the large contribution of termsof-trade shocks to the volatility of price variables has a different origin. Roughly half the difference between periods can be attributed to the larger response to shocks in the 90s, while the other half is the result of a substantially lower volatility of the price variables in pegs during the 90s. 24 The third set of results in Table 4 shows the dynamic responses by region. Africa and Latin America show patterns that are similar to those in the full sample. Despite the considerable fall in the number of observations, short-run differences between regimes are significant. By contrast, the differences between regimes in Asia are not significant. The effect of terms of trade on the real GDP of pegs in Asia is larger and more persistant through time than in other regions. 25 The immediate depreciation of the real exchange rate is smaller and less robust than in the other regions. In the case of Asia, estimating the VAR without restriction (2) renders larger real GDP responses in pegs and larger real exchange rate responses in floats.
The bottom part of Table 3 illustrates the importance of terms-of-trade disturbances in explaining the fluctuations of the endogenous variables in the different regions. Differences across regions are less pronounced than differences across time periods. Across regions, the only contributions that are substantially different are those for consumer prices in countries with flexible regimes. In Latin America terms-of-trade shocks explain only 3% of the consumer price fluctuations while they explain 33% of the price variance in Africa. This difference is mostly driven by the stronger transmission mechanism of terms of trade to prices in Africa relative to Latin America, since the overall variance of terms of trade and prices is similar across both regions. A feature common to all regions is the fact that in spite of the larger overall real GDP volatility in pegs relative to floats, terms-of-trade disturbances can explain a larger share of this volatility in pegs than in floats.
The last robustness check of this sub-section examines the possibility of non-linearities in the response to shocks. There is a vast literature of state-dependent pricing models suggesting that pegs may find it less costly to change prices when faced by large shocks than when faced by smaller shocks. By contrast, floats may find smaller shocks easier to buffer because they require smaller price changes and, therefore, less resistance from exchange-rate sensitive groups. 26 I replicate the VAR analysis allowing for different termsof-trade coefficients depending on the magnitude of the shock. In particular, I treat all terms-of-trade changes smaller than 4% in absolute value as "small". 27 In the case of pegs, real GDP changes coming from the small-shock VAR are smaller than those from the more general VAR (full sample). Real GDP drops only 1.2% compared to 1.9% in the full sample.
Price changes, however, are still equally slow to occur in countries with fixed regimes under the small-shock restriction. For floats, the real depreciation obtained is equally as large as that in the full sample. Overall, responses for small shocks are less significant than for large shocks. This point notwithstanding, the same pattern emerges from smaller shocks as from larger shocks.
The stability of the responses across time periods can also be interpreted as evidence against the presence of non-linearities. The reason is that the absolute value of the average terms-of-trade shock has changed considerably across decades; it was high during the 70s as a result of the major oil shocks but has fallen since then.
Dollarization and Financial Development
In this sub-section I present the results obtained from using two special samples of countries.
First, I analyze the response of countries in the CFA zone in Africa versus all African floaters. Second, I examine the group of highly dollarized countries. The first comparison is informative because in this special sample, as opposed to in the full sample, pegs are more financially developed than floats. Table A2 in the appendix shows that in the full sample the level of financial development, proxied by the ratio between quasi-money and money, is significantly larger in floats than in pegs. 28 Caballero (2001) has emphasized the role of financial development in smoothing external shocks. To safely interpret the differences across regimes as caused by the exchange rate regime and not by the different levels of financial development, I repeat the exercise from the previous section for this special sample. The findings are presented in section (5) of Table 4 . The responses to all three endogenous variables are significantly different across regimes and consistent with the pattern observed in the full sample. This is interpreted as evidence that the level of financial development is not the underlying cause driving the results.
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The second sample includes the group of countries classified as highly and moderately dollarized by Balino et al. (1999) . Reinhart (2000) argues that one of the explanations for developing countries' unwillingness to float is the negative balance sheet effects that a real depreciation imply to sectors indebted in dollars. Thus, one expects the floats from this group to exhibit a higher reluctance to accept larger real depreciations in the exchange rate than the rest of the floats. Table 4 examines how highly dollarized floats cope with terms of trade changes. The short-run depreciation of the real exchange rate is as large and significant in highly dollarized floats as it is in the average float in the full sample. 30 This suggests that highly dollarized countries are able to use the flexibility of their exchange rate regime to cope with terms-of-trade shocks in a similar way to the average float in the sample.
Concluding Remarks
The fixed versus flexible debate remains highly contentious. In the search for clearer answers, the theoretical arguments involved ought to be tested and quantified. The main contribution of this paper is to isolate one specific type of real shock, the terms of trade of a country, 28 This is also the case using other indicators. For example, bank assets over GDP and bank liabilities over GDP. 29 The response of real GDP is similar to that in Hoffmaister and Roldos (1997) . However, the authors find that the real exchange rate response is gradual in non-CFA countries and immediate in CFA countries, opposite to what I find here. 30 One difference between highly dollarized floats and the average float is that in the long-run, prices in highly dollarized countries fall. The fall is large in magnitude but statistically insignificant. and examine how countries with different regimes cope with this shock. Thus, the paper is able to scrutinize Friedman's hypothesis and identify significant differences in the responses to terms-of-trade shocks across exchange rate regimes.
The paper presents substantial evidence in favor of Friedman's predictions that short-run real GDP responses to real shocks are significantly smoother in floats than in pegs. Furthermore, the real exchange rate response is consistent with the assertion that the exchange rate regime plays a key role in explaining the different observed real GDP responses. In response to a fall in the terms of trade, the small and slow real depreciation observed in pegs is due to the fall in domestic prices while the large and immediate real depreciation in floats reflects a large nominal depreciation. This pattern is present in all of the time periods and regions examined, though it is most pronounced in the 80s and in Africa. Notes: Each cell reports the percent of the total short or long run variance of the corresponding variable that is explained by terms-of-trade shocks. Short (long) run decompositions are based on the mean square error of the two (ten) period ahead forecast.
Real Exchange Rate Consumer Prices Real GDP (4) under "Positive" where the change is of +10%). Wald tests the null hypothesis of all terms of trade coefficients being equal across exchange rate regimes. * ** and *** stars mean significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Stars next to Impact (Short run) effects for Flexible regimes stand for the significance of the null hypothesis of the first lag (first to third lag) of the terms of trade coefficient being equal across exchange rate regimes. 
